“Who gets what and why: The new economics of market design” – Alvin Roth Talk

The Millennium Institute for Research on Market Imperfections and Public Policies (MIPP) and the Center for Mathematical Modeling (CMM) of the University of Chile, invite the talk “Who gets what and why: The new economics of market design ”, which will be dictated by Alvin Roth, 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics.

The event will take place on Wednesday, December 20, 2023 at 12:00 p.m. in the Hall of Honor of the Central House of the University of Chile, located at Av. Alameda Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins 1058, Santiago. The talk will be in English, however, it will have simultaneous translation into Spanish.

It is essential to reserve your participation in advance, reserve your spot here

Who is Alvin Roth and what will he present?

Alvin Roth is an American economist born in New York in 1951. He graduated from the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences at Columbia University in 1971 with a bachelor’s degree in Operations Research. He then moved to Stanford University, receiving both his master’s and doctoral degrees there, also in Operations Research in 1973 and 1974, respectively.

Currently, he is a university professor at Stanford researching game theory and experimental economics.

Roth developed an algorithm within game theory to regulate the design of markets according to supply and demand. This algorithm turned out to be key for patients who need a kidney because there is a great shortage of these organs for donation, since they have to be matched very carefully.

Thanks to the economist’s work, in 2012 the longest donation chain in the world was achieved in the United States: 30 patients received kidneys from 30 unknown donors in a complicated process that lasted four months and involved 17 hospitals in 11 states.

This led him to win the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012 along with Lloyd S. Shapley, from the University of California (UCLA).

In this talk, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics will present his book that reveals the principles that govern “matching” markets, in which money usually plays a discreet or no role.

The event is also organized by the Ring Project ACT210005: Information and Computation in Market Design of the Department of Industrial Engineering (DII).

Remember to reserve your spot if you want to participate!