Third-party intervention in sequential Wars of Attrition with incomplete information
4 September, 2024 12:30 hrs
Ttitle: Third-party intervention in sequential Wars of Attrition with incomplete information.
Speaker: Martin Castillo (Harris School Chicago)
Abstract: Vast literature in political science and political economy either argues or assumes that the state’s primary role is to provide security. I propose a dynamic model to study the strategic interaction of a state and violent non-state groups that violently compete over rents and when there is uncertainty about the strength of each group. In the model, non-state groups fight sequential Wars of Attrition with replacement under asymmetric information. The violent competition between groups generates a negative externality for the state; the state wants to minimize competition and can temporarily weaken groups’ military capabilities by targeting them. The analysis shows that public information about the strength of the last winner of a conflict mediates a trade-off between the likelihood and the intensity of violence when a new group emerges as a challenger; that even if targeting groups is costless for the state, targeting both groups is not always the optimal violence-reducing policy, when the state is weak its optimal policy is to take sides in favor of the incumbent group; and that these differences between weak and strong states will shape the dynamics of reputation building of violent non-state groups.
Location:
Sala de Consejo, Beauchef 851, piso 4 | Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, UCHILE
Speaker:
Martin Castillo
MIPP Chile 2024