We analyze a competitive research-oriented public program established in Spain, the Ramon y Cajal Program, intended to o¤er contracts in public research centers to high-quality researchers. We study the e¤ects of the Program on the ex-post scienti c productivity of its recipients, relative to unsuccessful applicants with comparable curricula at the time of application. The full sample results demonstrate that the Program has a positive and signi cant e¤ect on the scienti c impact of the recipients, as measured by the average and the maximum impact factors, but the e¤ect on the number of published papers is not signi cant. Consequently, receiving a contract does not signi cantly a¤ect the quantity, but increases the quality, of the contract recipientspublications. This result is primarily driven by the particular relevance of experimental sciences in the Program.
Location:
Room 23, Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Chile ( Domeyko 2338, second floor, Santiago)
Speaker:
Antonio Romero-Medina
MIPP Chile 2024