Minicourse- Information Aggregation in Elections

Elections are often seen as mechanisms to aggregate information dispersed in an electorate. But voters may vote strategically and draw inferences based on what other voters know. This mini-course will describe how voters may choose to vote, abstain, or communicate based on their inferences about the behavior of others. Finally, we will also focus on how adverse selection may naturally emerge in a political context, manifesting as voters being suspicious of each other.

Pofessor: S. Nageeb Ali, Associate Professor of Economics, Penn State

Requirements: An appropriate background for this course is the first year of microeconomic theory at the graduate level, particularly game theory.

Schedule:   October 18 (Thursday) 10:15 AM -11: 45 AM
October 19 (Friday) 10:15 AM -11: 45 AM

Language: English

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