INSTITUTO MILENIO IMPERFECCIONES DE MERCADO Y POLÍTICA PÚBLICAS

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Lanzamiento: nuevo Ciclo de Seminarios web CEA-MIPP 2020

7 agosto, 2020

A través de los seminarios que se realizan durante todo el año, el MIPP se compromete a reunir académicos renombrados para introducir a la audiencia a investigaciones relevantes en el área, cubriendo un amplio espectro de temas en Economía. En esta oportunidad debido a la pandemia, estos se realizarán Vía ZOOM.

En conjunto con el Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) de la Universidad de Chile, las y los invitamos a participar de los siguientes Seminarios:


Guillermo Marshall (Sauder UBC) – Miércoles  12 de Agosto, 15:00 hrs.
TITULO: «Innovation During a Crisis»     

The value of innovation during crises with no adequate existing solution can be extraordinary. While higher payoffs increase the rate of innovation, they can also induce strategic distortion in its direction. We show theoretically that an increase in payoffs increases competition among inventors, inducing a shift toward less promising but quicker-to-finish inventions. Empirically, we estimate the size of the distortion using entry with vaccines versus non-vaccines drugs during the Covid-19 pandemic. Our estimates suggest that a social planner would have increased the number of firms working on vaccines by 15 percent. Policy remedies include advance purchase commitments based on ex-ante value, targeted research subsidies, or antitrust exemptions for joint research ventures.


Ramiro de Elejalde (UAH) – Miércoles 2 de Septiembre, 15:00 hrs.
TITULO: «More hospital choices, more C-sections: Evidence from Chile»

In this paper, we study the effect on cesarean rates of a policy change in Chile that decreased the cost of delivery at private hospitals for women with public health insurance. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach based on the eligibility conditions for this benefit, we find that in the first three years after the policy took effect, deliveries in private hospitals increased by 16.9 percentage points, while the probability of a C-section being performed increased by 9.4 percentage points. We show that the probability of an early-term birth in hospitals participating in the program is an increasing function of expected hospital demand at the time of the full-term due date. This suggests that in the absence of price incentives, hospitals use C-sections to smooth out demand across weeks to optimize the use of their resources.


Christopher Neilson (Princeton) – Miércoles 23 de Septiembre, 15:00 hrs.
TITULO: «Centralized Assignment Mechanisms, Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off Platform Options»

In many settings, market designers must contend with the presence of firms which they do not directly control and who do not participate in the “designed” portion of the market. We study the case of a decentralized “off-platform” aftermarket which operates jointly with a centralized college admissions platform in Chile. We evaluate the impacts of this aftermarket on college enrollment, persistence, graduation, and students’ welfare. To do so, we exploit a policy change in 2012 which caused a significant number of off-platform higher education programs to join the platform. We show that the share of students declining their placed spot decreased by 8%, dropout rates at the end of the first year of college dropped by 2 percentage points (a 16% drop) and graduation within six years increased by 2 to 5 percentage points following this event. To quantify welfare impacts and decompose channels, we develop and estimate an empirical model of college applications, aftermarket waitlists, and matriculation choices using detailed individual-level administrative data from Chile on almost half a million applicants. According to model estimates, welfare increases substantially, especially for less advantaged students and for women, following the policy change. Counterfactual analysis suggests that more desirable options generate larger negative externalities when not on the platform. These externalities are driven by students who receive and decline on-platform offers and are amplified by substantial frictions in waitlists. Our results indicate that platform design and the scope of the platform can have real impacts on outcomes of interest.


¡Las y los esperamos!

Confirmaciones: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl

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